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Single Idea 10437

[from 'Naming and Necessity lectures' by Saul A. Kripke, in 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names ]

Full Idea

It was important to Kripke to contrast the rigidity of names with the non-rigidity of many or most definite descriptions.

Gist of Idea

Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions

Source

report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.6

Book Reference

'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Lepore,E/Smith,B [OUP 2008], p.418


A Reaction

Philosophers always want sharp distinctions, but there are tricky names like 'Homer' and 'Jack the Ripper' where the name is stable, but its referent wobbles.