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Single Idea 10925

[from 'Reference and Modality' by Willard Quine, in 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive ]

Full Idea

Failure of substitutivity shows that the occurrence of a personal name is not purely referential.

Clarification

'Substitutivity' is swapping the names without changing the truth

Gist of Idea

Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential

Source

Willard Quine (Reference and Modality [1953], §1)

Book Reference

Quine,Willard: 'From a Logical Point of View' [Harper and Row 1963], p.140


A Reaction

I don't think I understand the notion of a name being 'purely' referential, as if it somehow ceased to be a word, and was completely transparent to the named object.