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Single Idea 10960

[from 'Metaphysics' by Aristotle, in 2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions ]

Full Idea

What makes it the case that, if we call the account of something a 'definition', that thing is a unity? If 'two-footed animal' is the account of man, and a definition, why, then, is 'man' a single thing and not a plurality (viz. animal and two-footed)?

Gist of Idea

If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity?

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037b10)

Book Reference

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.212


A Reaction

The obvious answer, I would have thought, is that we can think of man as a unity or as a plurality, depending on which aspect we are interested in. I see no problem with this. Nature offers us unities, but we ultimately select them.