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Single Idea 11000

[from 'Thinking About Logic' by Stephen Read, in 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts ]

Full Idea

If each possible world constitutes a concrete reality, then no object can be present in more than one world - objects may have 'counterparts', but cannot be identical with them.

Gist of Idea

If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts

Source

Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4)

Book Reference

Read,Stephen: 'Thinking About Logic' [OUP 1995], p.117


A Reaction

This explains clearly why in Lewis's modal realist scheme he needs counterparts instead of rigid designation. Sounds like a slippery slope. If you say 'Humphrey might have won the election', who are you talking about?