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Single Idea 11163

[from 'Essence and Modality' by Kit Fine, in 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities ]

Full Idea

Can we not recognise a sense of 'what an object is', according to which it lies in the nature of a singleton to have Socrates as a member, even though it does not lie in the nature of Socrates to belong to the singleton?

Clarification

A 'singleton' is a set with a unique member

Gist of Idea

The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa

Source

Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 5)

Book Reference

-: 'Philosophical Perspectives' [-], p.5


A Reaction

Important and persuasive. It echoes the example in Idea 11162, that the necessary relation is not part of the essence. Socrates is necessarily in {Socrates}, but that is because of the set, not because of Socrates. Essences causes necessities.

Related Idea

Idea 11162 Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]