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Single Idea 11292

[from 'Metaphysics' by Aristotle, in 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition ]

Full Idea

A what-it-was to-be-that-thing only belongs to those things for whom an account just is a definition.

Gist of Idea

Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030a06)

Book Reference

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.179


A Reaction

That seems to be that 'to ti en einai' (aka essence) only has a 'logos' if it has a 'horismos'. It seems that having a definition as its account is a necessary condition for an essence, but not sufficient. It looks to me as if essence must be explanatory.