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Single Idea 12093

[from 'Metaphysics' by Aristotle, in 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined ]

Full Idea

Aristotle's argument is that if we understand the substance of a thing to be that which unifies it, and if we understand that a universal is predicated of many things, then we will see that a universal cannot be the substance of a thing.

Gist of Idea

Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance

Source

report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b1-15) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle

Book Reference

Witt,Charlotte: 'Substance and Essence in Aristotle' [Cornell 1994], p.158


A Reaction

Presumably if universals are predicated of something, or something 'partakes' of the universal, then we want to know about the 'something', not about the universal. But do we end up with substances being 'bare particulars'?