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Single Idea 12213

[from 'The Question of Ontology' by Kit Fine, in 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers ]

Full Idea

I suggest we give up on the account of ontological claims in terms of existential quantification. The commitment to the integers is not an existential but a universal commitment, to each of the integers, not to some integer or other.

Gist of Idea

Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification

Source

Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.167)

Book Reference

'Metametaphysics', ed/tr. Chalmers/Manley/Wasserman [OUP 2009], p.167


A Reaction

In classical logic it is only the existential quantifier which requires the domain to be populated, so Fine is more or less giving up on classical logic as a tool for doing ontology (apparently?).