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Single Idea 12218

[from 'The Question of Ontology' by Kit Fine, in 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence ]

Full Idea

Being the case in reality and being fundamental are not sufficient for one another. If one agrees with Thales that the world is composed of water, and with Aristotle that water is indefinitely divisible, then water would be real but not fundamental.

Gist of Idea

Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible

Source

Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.174)

Book Reference

'Metametaphysics', ed/tr. Chalmers/Manley/Wasserman [OUP 2009], p.174


A Reaction

Presumably the divisibility would make a reductionist account of water possible. The Atlantic Ocean is real, but water molecules would have a more prominent place in the ontology of any good metaphysician.