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Single Idea 12246

[from 'Real Essentialism' by David S. Oderberg, in 26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One ]

Full Idea

Even if there were no multiplicity in unity - only a Parmenidean 'block' - still the question would arise as to what gave the amorphous lump its unity; by virtue of what would it be one rather than many?

Gist of Idea

What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many?

Source

David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.1)

Book Reference

Oderberg,David S.: 'Real Essentialism' [Routledge 2009], p.46


A Reaction

Which is prior, division or unification? If it was divided, he would ask what divided it. One of them must be primitive, so why not unity? If one big Unity is primitive, why could not lots of unities be primitive? Etc.