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Single Idea 12424

[from 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' by Willard Quine, in 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic ]

Full Idea

The last section of Quine's article challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori.

Gist of Idea

Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori

Source

report of Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 04.5

Book Reference

Kitcher,Philip: 'The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge' [OUP 1984], p.80


A Reaction

That is, Quine does not deny that there are truths which rest entirely on meaning. It is a 'dogma of empiricism' that the a priori can be equated with the analytic (and the necessary).