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Single Idea 12974

[from 'New Essays on Human Understanding' by Gottfried Leibniz, in 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names ]

Full Idea

Someone who goes wrong in relating an idea to a name will usually go wrong about the thing he wants the name to stand for.

Gist of Idea

People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.29)

Book Reference

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'New Essays on Human Understanding', ed/tr. Remnant/Bennett [CUP 1996], p.265


A Reaction

This seems to give tentative support to a Millian account of names, whose only content is just the thing which is named. Leibniz's observation certainly seems to be right.