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Single Idea 14657

[from 'World and Essence' by Alvin Plantinga, in 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity ]

Full Idea

Is there any reason to suppose that 'being identical with Socrates' names a property? Well, is there any reason to suppose that it does not? I cannot think of any, nor have I heard any that are at all impressive.

Gist of Idea

Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it

Source

Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II)

Book Reference

Plantinga,Alvin: 'Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 2003], p.58


A Reaction

Is there any reason to think that a planet somewhere is entirely under the control of white mice? Extraordinary. No wonder Plantinga believes in God and the Ontological Argument, as well as the existence of 'Socrateity' etc.