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Single Idea 14929

[from 'Every Thing Must Go' by J Ladyman / D Ross, in 8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations ]

Full Idea

Many philosophers say that one cannot intelligibly subscribe to the reality of relations unless one is also committed to the fact of some things that are related.

Gist of Idea

A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related

Source

J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 3.5)

Book Reference

Ladyman,J/Ross,D: 'Every Thing Must Go' [OUP 2007], p.154


A Reaction

Ladyman and Ross try to argue against this view, but the idea makes a strong impression on me. Your ontology seems to be rather strange if you have a set of structural relations that await things to slot into the structure.