back to ideas for this text


Single Idea 15113

[from 'Essence, Necessity and Explanation' by Kathrin Koslicki, in 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences ]

Full Idea

Individual instances of a kind of phenomenon, in Aristotle's view, can only be perceived through sense-perception; but they are not the proper subject-matter of scientific demonstration and definition.

Gist of Idea

Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals

Source

Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1)

Book Reference

'Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics', ed/tr. Tahko,Tuomas [CUP 2012], p.198


A Reaction

A footnote (11) explains that this is because they involve syllogisms, which require universals. I take Aristotle, and anyone sensible, to rest on individual essences, but inevitably turn to generic essences when language becomes involved.