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Single Idea 15147

[from 'Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences' by Anjan Chakravarrty, in 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism ]

Full Idea

The fact that members of some cluster kinds are subjects of causal generalizations reflects the degree to which they share causally efficacious properties, not the fact that they may be composed of essence kinds per se.

Gist of Idea

Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence'

Source

Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)


A Reaction

I think this is right. I am a fan of individual essences, but not of kind essences. I take kinds, and kind explanations, to be straightforward inductive generalisations from individuals. Extreme stabilities give the illusion of a kind essence.

Related Idea

Idea 15146 Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty]