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Single Idea 15160

[from 'Semantics for Natural Languages' by Donald Davidson, in 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions ]

Full Idea

Davidson held that knowledge of truth and reference could give us a notion of meaning. He embraced Quine's rejection of analyticity, synonymy and ordinary meaning, and substituted truth and reference, when there was something genuine to capture.

Gist of Idea

Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead

Source

report of Donald Davidson (Semantics for Natural Languages [1970]) by Scott Soames - Philosophy of Language 2.3

Book Reference

Soames,Scott: 'Philosophy of Language' [Princeton 2010], p.45


A Reaction

I always get a warm glow when anyone suggests that the concept of meaning involves the concept of truth. I largely reject Quine. Davidson made a helpful suggestion!