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Single Idea 15188

[from 'Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense'' by Robin Le Poidevin, in 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism ]

Full Idea

It would appear that any denial of the existence of continuants entails a denial of change.

Gist of Idea

If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense

Source

Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 1)

Book Reference

'Questions of Time and Tense', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [OUP 2002], p.3


A Reaction

[He cites Lowe for this view] Presumably we don't just accept change at face value, in that case. Indeed, views about temporal parts or time-worms give a different account of change (though perhaps a less convincing one).