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Single Idea 15239

[from 'Causal Powers' by Harré,R./Madden,E.H., in 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature ]

Full Idea

There is a case for calling a generalisation a law when its only confirmation is the multiplication of instances, if they don't conflict with other criteria. In fact any supported generalisation could count as a law if there is no counter-evidence.

Gist of Idea

We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence

Source

Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II)

Book Reference

Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.33


A Reaction

This is the beginning of the modern doubts about laws of nature, fully articulated in Mumford 2004. It seems to me inescapable that laws drop out if our ontology is based on powerful particulars. They are just patterns of outcome.