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Single Idea 15590

[from 'Semantic Relationism' by Kit Fine, in 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic ]

Full Idea

Once Frege had provided a clear syntactic account of variables and once Tarski had supplemented this with a rigorous semantic account, it would appear that there was nothing more of significance to be said.

Gist of Idea

It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that

Source

Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1)

Book Reference

Fine,Kit: 'Semantic Relationism' [OUP 2007], p.6


A Reaction

He later remarks that there are now three semantic accounts: the Tarskian, the instantial, and the algebraic [see xref ideas]. He offers a fourth account in his Semantic Relationism. This grows from his puzzles about variables.

Related Ideas

Idea 15587 That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]

Idea 15592 The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]

Idea 15594 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]

Idea 15595 The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]