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Single Idea 15792

[from 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds' by William Lycan, in 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects ]

Full Idea

Meinong's Objects have sometimes been construed as sets of properties.

Gist of Idea

Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties

Source

William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)

Book Reference

'The Possible and the Actual', ed/tr. Loux,Michael J. [Cornell 1979], p.302


A Reaction

[Lycan cites Castaņeda and T.Parsons] You still seem to have the problem with any 'bundle' theory of anything. A non-existent object is as much intended to be an object as anything on my desk right now. It just fails to be.