back to ideas for this text


Single Idea 15795

[from 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds' by William Lycan, in 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds ]

Full Idea

A mentalistic approach to possible worlds is daunted by the paucity of actual mental events.

Gist of Idea

Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events

Source

William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)

Book Reference

'The Possible and the Actual', ed/tr. Loux,Michael J. [Cornell 1979], p.304


A Reaction

Why do they have to be actual, any more than memories have to be conscious? The mental events just need to be available when you need them. They are never all required simultaneously. This isn't mathematical logic!