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Single Idea 16097

[from 'Metaphysics' by Aristotle, in 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences ]

Full Idea

Aristotle shows that, for something to be a subject at all, it must be specifiable as something in itself, with essential properties that are mentioned in its defining account, since no subject can be the bearer of accidental properties alone.

Gist of Idea

To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties

Source

report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.3) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2

Book Reference

Gill,Mary Louise: 'Aristotle on Substance: Paradox of Unity' [Princeton 1989], p.41


A Reaction

This is Aristotle supporting the very modern necessary-properties view of essentialism. Notice that it emerges from being 'specifiable' - that is, from Aristotle's requirement that a logos and definition be available. He rejects bare particulars.