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Single Idea 16106

[from 'Metaphysics' by Aristotle, in 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species ]

Full Idea

Man and horse and items similarly imposed on the particulars but themselves general are not substances but a kind of composite of the relevant account in the relevant matter, considered universally.

Gist of Idea

Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1035b27)

Book Reference

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.204


A Reaction

Notice that these concepts are 'imposed' on particulars. This seems close to Locke's 'nominal' essence. It take this quotation to reinforce the priority of the particular in Aristotle's account.