back to ideas for this text


Single Idea 16129

[from 'Can there be Vague Objects?' by Gareth Evans, in 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality ]

Full Idea

Evans tries to derive a contradiction from the supposition that a given identity statement is of indeterminate truth-value. (As it happens, I consider that this argument is flawed)

Gist of Idea

Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague

Source

report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 1.3

Book Reference

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.11


A Reaction

A priori, I wouldn't expect to be able to settle the question of whether there are any vague objects simply by following some logical derivation. Empirical examination, and conceptual analysis (or stipulation) have to be involved.