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Single Idea 16158

[from 'Metaphysics' by Aristotle, in 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects ]

Full Idea

The concrete, particular object actually is a composite not just of matter and form, but also a large number of accidents, like size, weight, colour. So we should not assume that the composite of matter and form is identified with the concrete particular.

Gist of Idea

Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight

Source

report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], partic) by Michael Frede - Substance in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' p.74

Book Reference

Frede,Michael: 'Essays in Ancient Philosophy' [University of Minnesota 1987], p.74


A Reaction

That gives a nice well-rounded picture of how we should understand a physical object, to fit it into the rest of our conceptual scheme, and the way we think about it.