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Single Idea 16304

[from 'The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages' by Alfred Tarski, in 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth ]

Full Idea

Every really adequate theory of truth should also prove the law of non-contradiction. Therefore Tarski's notion of adequacy in Convention T fails to capture the intuitive notion of adequacy he is after.

Gist of Idea

Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction

Source

comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3

Book Reference

Halbach,Volker: 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth' [CUP 2011], p.19


A Reaction

Tarski points out this weakness, in a passage quoted by Halbach. This obviously raises the question of what truth theories should prove, and this is explored by Halbach. If they start to prove arithmetic, we get nervous. Non-contradiction and x-middle?