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Single Idea 16463

[from 'Actualism and Thisness' by Robert Merrihew Adams, in 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity ]

Full Idea

Adams favours haecceitism about actual things but no haecceities for things that might exist but don't.

Gist of Idea

Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist

Source

report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Actualism and Thisness [1981]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.2

Book Reference

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Mere Possibilities' [Princeton 2012], p.97


A Reaction

This contrasts with Plantinga, who proposes necessary essences for everything, even for what might exist. Plantinga sounds crazy to me, Adams merely interesting but not too plausible.

Related Idea

Idea 16469 Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]