Full Idea
One could empirically reject a centralised power within a substance - and still think a genuine substance requires a form of some more abstract kind, not for a physical explanation, but for a full metaphysical understanding of how things are.
Gist of Idea
There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding
Source
Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 25.2)
Book Reference
Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.580
A Reaction
This divorce of the 'metaphysical' from the physical is a running theme in Pasnau, and he cites support from Leibniz. I'm not sure I understand 'metaphysical' understanding, if it is actually contrary to physics. I take it to be 'psychological'.