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Single Idea 16847

[from 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd)' by Peter Lipton, in 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation ]

Full Idea

The counterfactual conception of causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient conditions for their effects.

Gist of Idea

Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient

Source

Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause')

Book Reference

Lipton,Peter: 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd ed)' [Routledge 2004], p.133


A Reaction

Interesting. Then causes would be necessary, but would not necessitate. So what makes a cause sufficient?