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Single Idea 16908

[from 'Notebooks 1914-1916' by Ludwig Wittgenstein, in 5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic ]

Full Idea

The 'self-evidence' of which Russell talks so much can only be dispensed with in logic if language itself prevents any logical mistake.

Gist of Idea

We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes

Source

comment on Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 4) by Robin Jeshion - Frege's Notion of Self-Evidence 4

Book Reference

-: 'Mind' [-], p.973


A Reaction

Jeshion presents this as a key idea, turning against Frege, and is the real source of the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy. If self-evidence is abandoned, then language itself is the guide to truth, so study language. I think I prefer Frege. See Quine?