Full Idea
It is just not, in any intuitive sense of necessity, a necessary truth that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him.
Gist of Idea
It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him
Source
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 2)
Book Reference
Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.74
A Reaction
This replies to Searle's claim that to be Aristotle he must have a fair number of the properties. Even if Searle is right, you can hardly pick the properties out individually and claim they are necessary. Kripke pulls epistemology away from metaphysics.
Related Idea
Idea 16355 Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati]