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Single Idea 17943

[from 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics' by Mark Colyvan, in 14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem ]

Full Idea

Those who see probabilities as ratios of frequencies can't use Bayes's Theorem if there is no objective prior probability. Those who accept prior probabilities tend to opt for a subjectivist account, where probabilities are degrees of belief.

Gist of Idea

Probability supports Bayesianism better as degrees of belief than as ratios of frequencies

Source

Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 9.1.8)

Book Reference

Colyvan,Mark: 'An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics' [CUP 2012], p.156


A Reaction

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