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Single Idea 18038

[from 'Vagueness' by Timothy Williamson, in 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics ]

Full Idea

In a formal semantics we can label two properties 't' and 'f' and suppose that some sentences have neither (or both). Such a manoeuvre shows nothing of philosophical interest. No connection has been made between 't' and 'f' and truth and falsity.

Gist of Idea

The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false

Source

Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 7.2)

Book Reference

Williamson,Timothy: 'Vagueness' [Routledge 1996], p.190


A Reaction

This is right, and means there is a huge gulf between 'formal' semantics (which could be implemented on a computer), and seriously interesting semantics about how language refers to and describes the world.