Full Idea
The shape of a cone we can form for ourselves in intuition, unassisted by any experience, according to its concept alone, but the colour of this cone must be previously given in some experience or other.
Gist of Idea
We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour
Source
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B743/A715)
Book Reference
Kant,Immanuel: 'Critique of Pure Reason', ed/tr. Guyer,P /Wood,A W [CUO 1998], p.631
A Reaction
Coffa says this gives a 'transcendental twist' to the primary/secondary distinction. The distinction doesn't seem to help much, since you clearly don't know the shape of a pebble from its concept. Is the angle of the cone part of its concept?