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Single Idea 18858

[from 'The Limits of Contingency' by Gideon Rosen, in 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity ]

Full Idea

It may be metaphysically necessary in one sense that sets or universals or mereological aggregates exist, while in another sense existence is always a contingent matter.

Gist of Idea

Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another

Source

Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 10)

Book Reference

'Identity and Modality', ed/tr. MacBride,Fraser [OUP 2006], p.38


A Reaction

This idea depends on Idea 18856 and 18857. Personally I only think mereological aggregates and sets exist when people decide that they exist, so I don't see how they could ever be necessary. I'm unconvinced about his two concepts.

Related Ideas

Idea 18856 Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]

Idea 18857 Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]