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Single Idea 18879

[from 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology' by Ross P. Cameron, in 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths ]

Full Idea

The explanation of the truth of the proposition [p] doesn't stop at it being the case that p, so it's false to claim that whenever a proposition is true it's true in virtue of the world being as the proposition says it is. The features often lie deeper.

Gist of Idea

What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker

Source

Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Grounding')

Book Reference

'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.123


A Reaction

[He is opposing Jennifer Hornsby 2005] Cameron offers 'the average family has 2.4 children' as a counterexample' (since no one actually has 2.4 children). That seems compelling. Second example: 'the rose is beautiful'.