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Single Idea 19079

[from 'The Coherence Theory of Truth' by James O. Young, in 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers ]

Full Idea

Idealists do not believe that there is an ontological distinction between beliefs and what makes beliefs true. From their perspective, reality is something like a collection of beliefs.

Gist of Idea

For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct

Source

James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §2.1)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.2


A Reaction

This doesn't seem to me to wholly reject truthmakers, since beliefs can still be truthmakers for one another. This is something like Davidson's view, that only beliefs can justify other beliefs.