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Single Idea 19165

[from 'Metaphysics' by Aristotle, in 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth ]

Full Idea

Aristotle's formulation postulates no entities like facts. The things of which we say that they are or that they are not are the entities adverted to by the referring parts of sentences, not by sentences as wholes.

Gist of Idea

Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes

Source

report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011b21) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 6

Book Reference

Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.127


A Reaction

Aristotle seems to refer to the existences or non-existences of things. Presumably this would mean referring not to an apple, but to a red apple or a green apple, seen as two different things, even though they were the 'same' apple?

Related Idea

Idea 586 Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle]