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Single Idea 19514

[from 'The Case for Contextualism' by Keith DeRose, in 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism ]

Full Idea

The great rival to contextualism is classical 'invariantism' - invariantism about the truth-conditions [for knowing], combined with variable standards for warranted assertability.

Gist of Idea

Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards

Source

Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.12)

Book Reference

DeRose,Keith: 'The Case for Contextualism' [OUP 2009], p.27


A Reaction

That is, I take it, that we might want to assert that someone 'knows' something, when the truth is that they don't. That is, either you know or you don't, but we can bend the rules as to whether we say you know. I take this view to be false.