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Single Idea 19715

[from 'Defeasibility Theory' by Thomas Grundmann, in 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility ]

Full Idea

There are 'rebutting' defeaters against the truth of a previously justified belief, 'undercutting' defeaters against the power of the evidence, and 'reason-defeating' defeaters against the truth of the reason for the belief.

Gist of Idea

You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth

Source

Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'How')

Book Reference

'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.158


A Reaction

That is (I think) that you can defeat the background, the likelihood, or the truth. He cites Pollock 1986, and implies that these are standard distinctions about defeaters.