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Single Idea 19725

[from 'Reliabilism' by Juan Comesaņa, in 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism ]

Full Idea

If the processes of belief-formation are unreliable (perhaps in a sceptical scenario), then reliabilism has the consequence that those victims can never have justified beliefs (which Sosa calls the 'new evil demon problem').

Gist of Idea

In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified?

Source

Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.1)

Book Reference

'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.178


A Reaction

That may be the right outcome. Could you have mathematical knowledge in a sceptical scenario? But that would be different processes. If I might be a brain in a vat, then it's true that I have no perceptual knowledge.