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Single Idea 20204

[from 'Eudemian Ethics' by Aristotle, in 15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties ]

Full Idea

It makes no difference if the soul is divided into parts or lacks parts, as it certainly has distinct capacities.

Gist of Idea

Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities

Source

Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1219b32), quoted by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind II 3.1

Book Reference

Zagzebski,Linda: 'Virtues of the Mind' [CUP 1996], p.140


A Reaction

I take this to endorse my view that the mind-body problem is of limited interest to philosophers. The focus should be on what the mind does, not how it is constructed. But then I presume the latter issue is revealed by neuroscience.

Related Idea

Idea 23648 First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid]