back to ideas for this text


Single Idea 21307

[from 'Treatise of Human Nature' by David Hume, in 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self ]

Full Idea

Who will affirm, because he has entirely forgot the incidents of past days, that the present self is not the same person with the self of that time? And by that means overturn all the most established notions of personal identity?

Gist of Idea

Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person?

Source

David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6)

Book Reference

Hume,David: 'A Treatise of Human Nature', ed/tr. Selby-Bigge/Nidditch [OUP 1978], p.262


A Reaction

This is a swipe at one of Locke's most controversial claims (especially when applied to incidents of criminal behaviour). Hume says memory constitutes this identity, but Locke's view says it merely reveals identity.

Related Ideas

Idea 12511 If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke]

Idea 12514 On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke]