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Single Idea 21538

[from 'Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions' by Bertrand Russell, in 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism ]

Full Idea

If two people can perceive the same object, as the possibility of any common world requires, then the object of an external perception is not in the mind of the percipient.

Gist of Idea

If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind

Source

Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.33)

Book Reference

Russell,Bertrand: 'Essays in Analysis', ed/tr. Lackey,Douglas [George Braziller 1973], p.33


A Reaction

This is merely an assertion of the realist view, rather than an argument. I take representative realism to tell a perfectly good story that permits two subjective representations of the same object.