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Single Idea 21664

[from 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics' by Thomas Hofweber, in 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience ]

Full Idea

The results from the use of supervenience in philosophical theorising are limited. In particular, modal notions can't distinguish between things which necessarily go together. For example, that truths about numbers are grounded in truths about sets.

Gist of Idea

Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together

Source

Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.1)

Book Reference

Hofweber,Thomas: 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics' [OUP 2018], p.327


A Reaction

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