Full Idea
It is suggested that anyone who has considered all the facts which could bear on his moral position has ipso facto produced a 'well founded' moral judgement, ...How 'x is good' can be well founded when 'x is bad' is equally well founded is hard to see.
Gist of Idea
Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad'
Source
Philippa Foot (Moral Arguments [1958], p.96)
Book Reference
Foot,Philippa: 'Virtues and Vices' [Blackwell 1981], p.96
A Reaction
This seems to be a warning to particularists, if they hope that moral judgements just emerge from the facts. It doesn't rule out physicalist naturalism about morality, if the attitudes we bring to the facts have arisen out of further facts.
Related Idea
Idea 18671 The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing]