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Single Idea 22377

[from 'Moral Arguments' by Philippa Foot, in 22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value ]

Full Idea

Whether a man is speaking of behaviour as rude or not rude, he must use the same criteria as anyone else. ...We have here an example of a non-evaluative premise from which an evaluative conclusion can be deduced.

Gist of Idea

Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value

Source

Philippa Foot (Moral Arguments [1958], p.104)

Book Reference

Foot,Philippa: 'Virtues and Vices' [Blackwell 1981], p.104


A Reaction

We would now call 'rude' a 'thick' ethical concept (where 'good' is 'thin'). Her powerful point is, I take it, that evidence is always relevant to judgements of thick concepts, so there is no fact-value gap. 'Rude' has criteria, but 'good' may not.

Related Idea

Idea 22376 Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot]