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Single Idea 22453

[from 'Ethical consistency' by Bernard Williams, in 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism ]

Full Idea

Williams insisted that the feelings we have in situations of moral conflict show that the 'structure' of moral judgements is unlike that of assertions expressing beliefs.

Gist of Idea

Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts

Source

report of Bernard Williams (Ethical consistency [1965]) by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.36

Book Reference

Foot,Philippa: 'Moral Dilemmas' [OUP 2002], p.36


A Reaction

Foot presents this as a key reason for the non-cognitivist view of ethics, and her paper attacks it. I don't usually react to moral disagreement with the same vigour I have when I think a belief is untrue. It may just be uncertainty, though.