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Single Idea 2445

[from 'The Elm and the Expert' by Jerry A. Fodor, in 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism ]

Full Idea

The question how mental representations could be both semantic, like propositions, and causal, like rocks, trees, and neural firings, is arguably just the interaction problem all over again.

Clarification

'Semantics' involves meanings. See Idea 4861 for the interaction problem.

Gist of Idea

Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again

Source

Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4)

Book Reference

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'The Elm and the Expert' [MIT 1995], p.84


A Reaction

Interesting way of presenting the problem. If you seem to be confronting the interaction problem, you have probably drifted into a bogus dualist way of thinking. Retreat, and reformulate you questions and conceptual apparatus, till the question vanishes.